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IS “PRODUCT HOPPING” ANTI-COMPETITIVE OR FAIR
GAME?: A LOOK AT THE SECOND AND THIRD CIRCUIT
DECISIONS IN ACTAVIS PLC AND MYLAN
PHARMACEUTICALS
Alexis S. White1
I.
INTRODUCTION
The pharmaceutical industry is composed of brand-name and generic2
drug markets.3 Typically, generic drugs directly compete with their brandname counterparts and are competitively priced.4 The introduction of new
drugs in both markets is heavily regulated in the United States. The Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) requires each proposed drug to submit a
New Drug Application (“NDA”), a process that evaluates the drug’s safety
and effectiveness for public consumption.5 NDA drugs, commonly called
brand-name drugs, enjoy a period of exclusivity that prevents their generic
equivalents from entering the market. Upon expiration of exclusivity rights,
generic manufacturers can apply for an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(“ANDA”)6. The ANDA process allows generic drug manufacturers to
“piggy-back” on approved NDAs.7 This expedites the testing process, allowing generic drugs to enter the market more quickly.

1. J.D. candidate at North Carolina Central University School of Law, Class of 2018; B.S. Biology 2015, summa cum laude, Tuskegee University.
2. Generic drugs are copies of brand-name drugs, possessing the same active ingredients, dosage,
route of administration, quality, performance characteristics and intended use. Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Understanding Generic Drugs - What Are Generic Drugs? Food and Drug Administration,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/Understanding
GenericDrugs/ucm144456.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2017).
3. International Trade Administration, PHARMACEUTICAL AND BIOTECH SPOTLIGHT: The
Pharmaceutical
and
Biotech
Industries
in
the
United
States, SelectUSA,
https://www.selectusa.gov/pharmaceutical-and-biotech-industries-united-states (last visited Mar 09,
2017).
4. Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Savings From Generic Drugs Purchased at Retail
Pharmacies, Food
and
Drug
Administration (May
3,
2004),
https://web.archive.org/web/20080223131005/http://www.fda.gov/cder/consumerinfo/savingsfromgener
icdrugs.htm.
5. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2016).
6. Id. § 355(j).
7. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228, 186 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2013) (stating that generic
manufacturers may circumvent the NDA process by demonstrating bioequivalence and pharmaceutical
equivalence); Donald J. Birkett, Generics - Equal or Not?, 26 Australian Prescriber 85 (NPS MedicineWise 2003) (adding that a generic drug is said to be pharmaceutical equivalent if it possesses the
same amount of active substance, dosage, and route of administration as its brand-name competition;
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The Sherman Antitrust Act (‘‘Sherman Act”), passed by Congress in
1890, prohibits certain business activities that federal government regulators deem to be anti-competitive.8 One pervasive tactic causing concern in
the pharmaceutical industry, falling within the arena of restricted practices
under the Sherman Act, is product hopping9. “Product hopping” is a tactic
that drug manufacturers use to keep generic competitors out of the market.10
Typically, it involves making insignificant modifications to existing brandname drug formulations, forcing generic competitors to exit the market, and
re-enter a cumbersome regulatory process. This results in monopolizations
by brand-name manufacturers.11 This note will review two cases, Actavis
PLC and Mylan Pharmaceuticals, in which generic manufacturers complain
of brand-name manufacturers “hard-switching”12 their products to obstruct
the generic drug market.
In New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC (2015), the plaintiff
filed for preliminary injunction, alleging that the defendants violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act.13 The Second Circuit upheld the lower court’s
decision to grant preliminary injunction.14 However, a recent opinion from
the Third Circuit rejected the reasoning in New York v. Actavis.
In Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v, Warner Chilcott (2016), the plaintiff
brought an action against a manufacturer, alleging the creation of an unfair
monopoly and the entering into an agreement under restraint trade in violabioequivalence describes the bioavailability of a generic drug compared to its brand-name competitor
under similar experimental conditions).
8. Gregory J. Werden, Competition, Consumer Welfare, & the Sherman Act, 9 Sedona Conf. J. 87
(2008) (“The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.”).
9. Jessie Cheng, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 108
Colum. L. Rev. 1471, 1472–73 (2008).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Brief for FTC at 19, Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott, Pub. Co., No. 12-3824 (E.D. Pa.
Nov.
21,
2012)
[hereinafter
FTC
Mylan
Brief],
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/amicus_briefs/mylan-pharmaceuticals-inc.v.warnerchilcott-plc-et-al./151001mylanamicusbrief.pdf (discussing how taking an extra step by removing a
brand-name drug from the market whose patent is approaching expiration while simultaneous introducing a new formulation coerces consumers; however, the popularity and success of the new formulation
is not based on merit, but based on manufacturers artificially extending their monopoly in the market by
impeding competition).
13. N.Y. ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed sub nom.
Allergan PLC v. N.Y. ex. rel. Schneiderman, 136 S. Ct. 581, 193 L. Ed. 2d 421 (2015) (discussing the
State’s antitrust action against drug manufacturer, alleging that drug manufacturer introduced Namenda
XR, an Alzheimer’s disease medication, at the end of the patent exclusivity period for the twice-daily
version, Namenda IR and removed Namenda IR off the shelves in order thwart competition from generic competitors; the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a preliminary injunction, ordered manufacturer to keep Namenda IR on the shelves until generic product entry
and the manufacturer appealed).
14. Id.
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tion of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 15 The Third Circuit in Mylan
found that the manufacturer’s actions did not obstruct the plaintiff from
entering the market and thus were not anti-competitive.16
Through the review of relevant anti-trust legislation and case law, this
note reconciles the courts’ split decisions by creating a test that preserves
the intent of the Sherman Act, while preserving brand-name manufacturers’
right to be competitive.
II. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND STATE
SUBSTITUTION LAWS
In 1984, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act, an act to amend the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(“FDCA”), better known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.17 The Hatch-Waxman
Act is a method of enabling competition between brand-name and generic
pharmaceutical markets while also incentivizing the development of new
drugs.18 The 1962 amendments to the FDCA imposed burdensome requirements that made the approval process costly and lengthy.19 Moreover,
only 15% of top-selling branded drugs with expired patents had generic
competition before the passing of the Hatch-Waxman amendments.20
The Hatch-Waxman amendments sought to cure these unintended consequences by extending patent exclusivity,21 while also simplifying the process for generic drugs to enter the market.22 Prior to 1984, the FDA required
that both brand-name drug manufacturers and generic drug manufacturers
submit a New Drug Application (“NDA”),23 which was “a long, compre15. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Warner Chilcott PLC et al., No. 15-2236, 2016 WL 5403626
(3d Cir. Sept. 28, 2016).
16. Id. (explaining the generic manufacturer’s filed action against brand-name manufacturer of
acne medication, alleging that they violated the Sherman Act by changing the formulation of their product and marketing and selling the new formulation as the expiration date for its older formulation’s
patent approached; the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted
summary judgment for brand-name name manufacturer and the generic manufacturer appealed).
17. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585.
18. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Amendments), U.S. Food and Drug Administration (before Senate Committee on the Judiciary) (Aug. 1, 2003),
http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/testimony/ucm115033.htm.
19. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (2012) (stating that ANDA requires the
applicant to: submit full reports of investigations, showing whether the drug is safe for use and whether
the drug is effective; provide a list of the components of the drug, a statement of the composition of the
drug, and a full description of the method and facilities used to manufacture, process, and package the
drugs; and submit assessments supporting claims that drug is safe and effective for use).
20. D Reiffen and MR Ward, Generic drug industry dynamics, TC Bureau Economics Working
Paper No. 248,37–49 (2002); See RE Caves, Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S.
Pharmaceutical Industry, Brookings paper on economics activity, 1-66 (1991).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2016).
22. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2016).
23. 21 U.S.C. § 355(2016).
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hensive, and costly testing process”24 that required filing scientific literature
to support the safety and efficacy of a drug before market entry was allowed.25 An approved brand-name drug enjoys a twenty-year patent exclusivity period in the market, at the end of which one or more generic drugs
that exhibit the same characteristics as the brand-name drug may enter the
market at a lower price to compete with the brand-name drug.26
The Hatch-Waxman Act introduced the ANDA27 to expedite the process
of introducing lower cost generic drugs to the market. Under the ANDA,
generic manufacturers can piggyback on the application of brand-name
comparable drugs if they can demonstrate bioequivalence and pharmaceutical equivalence.28 Once approved, the generic drug receives an “ABrating,”29 which allows pharmacists to fill prescriptions for brand-name
drugs with its generic doppelganger.30
By the time Hatch-Waxman was passed, many states enacted drug substitution legislation, further facilitating generic drug competition.31 Today,
drug substitution laws are present in all fifty states32 and permit pharmacists
to substitute subscriptions for brand-name drugs with generic drugs.33 In
over thirty states, drug substitution laws require not only that generic drugs
be bioequivalent34, but also pharmaceutically equivalent35 in accordance
with FDA AB-rating standards.36 However, because AB-rating requirements are so stringent, the Hatch-Waxman Act and state substitution laws
create loopholes for brand-name drug manufacturers to extend their periods

24. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228 (2013).
25. Garth Boehm et. al., Development of the Genetic Industry in the US After the Hatch-Waxman
Act of 1984, 3 Acta Pharaceutica Sinica, 297, 297 (2013).
26. New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 2015).
27. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2016).
28. Id.
29. FDA, Orange Book: Approved Drug with Therapeutic Equivalence Equations 7, 1-1400
(2017), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm.
30. Gerald Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 Food and Drug L. J., 187, 190 (1999).
31. Alison Mason & Robert L. Steiner, Generic Substitution and Prescription Drug Prices: Economic Effects of State Drug Product Selection Laws 1 (1985), http://1.usa.gov/1IS44Ju.
32. Jessie Cheng, Note, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry,
108 Colum. L. Rev. 1471, 1480 (2008).
33. Michael A. Carrier, A Real World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 109, 1017 (2010).
34. Drugs are said to be bioequivalent when “the rate and extent of absorption” of the drugs are
not significantly different; Kamal K Midha & Gordon McKay, Bioequivalence; Its History, Practice,
and Future, 11 AAPS Journal 664–670, 664 (2009).
35. “[P]roducts are considered pharmaceutical equivalents if they contain the same active ingredient(s), are of the same dosage form, route of administration and are identical in strength or concentration”; U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Therapeutic Equivalence-Related Terms, in Approved
Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations vii (37 ed. 2004).
36. Id. at 8.

Spring 2017]BIOTECHNOLOGY & PHARMACEUTICAL LAW REVIEW

43

of exclusivity.37 One way in which brand-name manufacturers extend their
exclusivity is by product hopping; this is accomplished by making trivial
changes to the brand-name drug in order to force its genetic equivalent back
into the regulatory process.38
III. PRODUCT HOPPING
The most significant threat to brand-name drug profitability is generic
drug entry.39 This is inevitable once a brand-name manufacturer loses its
ability to market exclusively to the public. When generic products enter the
market, the price of brand-name drugs drops dramatically. This incentivizes
brand-name firms to delay the entry of generic competition for as long as
possible.40
Most product hopping antitrust claims allege that a brand-name drug
manufacturer has manipulated the FDA system.41 When brand-name drug
manufacturers are confronted with the likelihood of rivalry once a patent
lapses or is held invalid, they can make minor changes to their endorsed
drugs, get FDA approval for those paltry modifications, and supplant the
old formulation with the new one.42
Product hopping can be achieved through several methods. Manufacturers can: (1) change some physical trait of the drug by switching from a capsule to a tablet or serrating the capsule itself for self-controlled dosing; (2)
change the molecular components without having any bearing on the drug’s
activity itself; or (3) combine drugs that were once marketed individually.43
From 1989 to 2000, for instance, only 35% of the 1,035 new drug applications approved by the FDA were for new molecular entities.44 Moreover,
54% of all approvals were for drugs with new dosage forms, route of administration, or were combined with another active ingredient.45

37. Cheng, supra note 9, at 1494 (“Product hopping itself amounts to little more than a thinly
disguised scheme to game the pharmaceutical industry’s regulatory system.”).
38. See generally M. Royall, Antitrust Scrutiny of Pharmaceutical “Product Hopping”, 28 Antitrust (2013).
39. See generally Steven Tenn and Brett W. Wendling, Entry Threats and Pricing in the Generic
Drug Industry (Oct. 2, 2012). US Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Economics Working Paper No.
301,https://ssrn.com/abstract=1622220 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1622220
40. Michael Carrier & Steve Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New Framework, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV 167, 176 (2016).
41. Id. at 71.
42. Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, IP & Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law § 15.3, at 74.1(Supp. 2010). (lowercase title)
43. Steve Shadowen et al., Anticompetitive Product Changes in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 41
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 24-25 (2009).
44. Changing Patterns of Pharmaceutical Innovation, The National Institute for Health Care
Management
Research
and
Educational
Foundation,
7
(2002),
http://www.nihcm.org/pdf/innovations.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2016) [Hereinafter Changing Patterns].
45. Id.; Shadowen, supra note 46.
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While these changes may seem insignificant to consumers, they present
unwarranted challenges to generic manufacturers and ultimately obstruct
consumers’ access to lower cost genetic drugs. This divergence between the
interests of manufacturers and consumers occurs because prescription
pharmaceutical markets are characterized by a “price disconnect” - a doctor, rather than the consumer, decides which product will be bought, but the
product is ultimately paid for by the consumer.46 Consequently, consumer
choice is commandeered and true market competition is obstructed.
Resolving issues pertaining to product hopping requires a balancing act.47
While courts are typically hesitant to question the judgment of the legislature, they also have a duty to preserve the integrity of the market by ensuring a balance between competition and innovation in these markets.48
A. The Sherman Act
The Sherman Act is a federal statute that prohibits certain business activities that federal government regulators deem to be anti-competitive, and
requires the federal government to investigate and pursue trusts.49
Historically, parties have challenged product hopping as anticompetitive
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act50, and the judicial treatment thus far
has hinged on the presence of consumer coercion.51 Section 2 of the Sherman Act focuses on single-firm monopolization of a market. Under Section 2, it is a felony “to monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with another person to monopolize trade.”52
Attempted monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act has three elements: “(1) the defendant engaged in predatory or exclusionary conduct;
(2) the defendant had a specific intent to monopolize; and (3) there was a
dangerous probability that the defendant would successfully attain monopoly power.”53 A claim in a civil action for such a violation requires these
elements plus an antitrust injury caused by the violation.54
An antitrust injury is an injury ”attributable to an anti-competitive aspect of
46. Changing Patterns, supra note 44.
47. Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 421 (D. Del. 2006); Walgreen
Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharms. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 149 (D.D.C. 2008).
48. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 Tex. L. Rev.
685, 686 (2009).
49. Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2003).
50. Lyneger, infra note 43, at 672; see also Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F.
Supp. 2d 146, 150 (D.D.C. 2008) (“The antitrust injury requirement ensures that a plaintiff can recover
only if the loss stems from a competition-reducing aspect or effect of the defendant’s behavior.”).
51. Cheng supra note 9, at 1473.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 2; see also Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 495 (2d
Cir. 2004).
53. Taylor Pub. Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Spectrum Sports, Inc.
v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456, 113 S. Ct. 884, 891, 122 L.Ed. 247 (1993).
54. Pac. Express, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 959 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1992).
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the practice under scrutiny.”55 This means that the injury does not result
from a competitor’s superiority over an inferior generic product, but stems
from a the competitor’s successful “gaming” of the system by artificially
extending their monopoly powers.
Courts have held that brand-name manufacturers are under no legal duty
to help their generic competitors; however, they must refrain from activities
that have no basis other than to thwart competition.56 From an antitrust perspective, product hopping is within the class of behaviors and practices that
the Sherman Act expressly condemns.57
The courts have attempted to create a workable rule to reconcile
these undermining practices beginning with Abbott Lab. v. Teva Pharm.
USA, Inc. (2006), the first case to allege an antitrust injury on the basis of
product hopping, and Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P. (2008) 58
B. Framing the Rule Against Product Hopping
Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA was the first case to squarely frame an
antitrust claim predicated on allegations of pharmaceutical product hopping.59 In Abbott Labs., Defendants Abbott and Fournier (“Defendants”)
were accused of making insignificant modifications to the brand-name drug
TriCor in order to sabotage the entry of its generic equivalent in the pharmaceutical market.60 Moreover, Defendants also removed the older versions
of TriCor off the shelves and changed the code for TriCor in the National
Drug Date File (NDDF)61 to “obsolete,” preventing pharmacies from filling
both brand-name and generic prescriptions for TriCor’s earlier formulations.62
The Court articulated that to violate Section 2 of Sherman Act, a monopolist’s conduct “must harm competitive process and thereby harm consum-

55. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334, 110 S.Ct. 1884, 495 U.S.
328 (1990).
56. Id. at 346; see also Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharms. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 151
(D.D.C. 2008); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 (2001) (“Judicial deference to product
innovation...does not mean that a monopolist’s product design decisions are per se lawful.”).
57. See generally United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); See also Vikram
Lyneger, Should Pharmaceutical Product Hopping Be Subject to Antitrust Scrutiny?, 7 J. Patent &
Trademark Office Soc. 663 (2015) (discussing whether product hopping is within the realm of practices
condemned under the Sherman Act).
58. Abbott Labs, 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 416-17; AstraZeneca Pharms. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146.
59. Carrier, supra note 43, at 192.
60. Abbott Labs, 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 416-17.
61. The NDDF, now called FDB MedKnowledge, is a private database that provides information
about FDA-approved drugs. 2015AB UMLS FDB MedKnowledge Source Information, U.S. National
Library of Medicine (2016), https://www.nlm.nih.gov/research/umls/sourcereleasedocs/current/NDDF/
(last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
62. Abbott Labs, 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 416.
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ers, but harm to one or more competitors will not suffice.”63 As long as a
manufacturer does not rob the consumer of choice, “[c]ourts should not
condemn a product change . . . unless they are relatively confident that the
conduct in question is anticompetitive.” 64 Moreover, the Court found that
the “rule-of-reason” test65 should be applied, balancing the “merits of new
product innovations against the arguable competitive obstacles such innovations may erect.”66
In Walgreen v. AstraZeneca, the plaintiffs brought an action against
AstraZeneca, alleging that the defendant violated the Sherman Act by introducing over-the-counter and prescription drug replacements for its prescription heartburn drug Prilosec as Prilosec’s patent was about to expire.67
The court found that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for attempted market monopolization.68 The court, relying on and distinguishing from the
reasoning in Abbott Lab and Microsoft, found that there was no “eliminat[ion] [of] consumer choice[]”69, adding that introduction of the new drug
by AstraZeneca competed with both its own and others’ drugs.70 Extrapolating from both cases, a clear rule is articulated: a change in product design is
per se legal, and courts will give deference to product innovation. However,
the presumption is rebuttable if a plaintiff can articulate an anticompetitive
injury. Upon showing an injury, the court will apply the rule-of-reason test
to balance the benefits of innovation with the harms and obstructions those
innovations might create in the competitive market.71
Although in Abbott Lab and AstraZeneca the courts arrived at two different decisions, the ‘rule-of-reason’ test was never applied in either case.72
63. Abbott Labs, supra note 50, at 420 (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3D 34,58
(D.C. Cir. 2001)).
64. Id. at 421 (quoting Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, IP & Antitrust §
12.1 (2006); See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 63, 287 (2d Cir. 1979) (“If a
monopolist’s products gain acceptance in the market ... it is of no importance that a judge or jury may
later regard them as inferior, so long as that success was not based on any form of coercion.”).
65. This test was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 61–62, 31 S.Ct. 502, 516, 55 L.Ed. 619 (1911). The D.C. Circuit in the Microsoft case, 253 F.3d
34, used this test to balance the anticompetitive harm caused by Microsoft’s design change to its website
and its procompetitive benefit; See also Paycom Billing Servs., Inc. v. Mastercard Int’l, Inc., 467 F.3d
283, 289-90 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that courts analyze most antitrust claims under the rule-of-reason
test).
66. Royall, supra note 38, at 73.
67. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 147-48.
68. Id. at 148.
69. Id. at 151.
70. Id.
71. See generally Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619
(1911); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3D 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Paycom Billing Servs., Inc. v.
Mastercard Int’l, Inc., 467 F.3d 283, 289-90 (2d Cir. 2006).
72. In 2009, Abbott Labs agreed to pay $184M to settle its antitrust claims arising out of litigation
with competitors Teva and Impax laboratories; See Samuel Howard, Abbott Settles TriCor Class Action
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Moreover, these cases fail to address the “grey area” between two polaropposite scenarios.73
IV. 2015 SPLIT COURT DECISIONS
In 2015, the Second and Third Circuits rendered decisions for cases involving product hopping.
A. New York v. Actavis PLC
In New York v. Actavis PLC, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit became the first appellate court to address product hopping.74 This case raised a novel question of antitrust law: “under what circumstances does conduct by a monopolist to perpetuate patent exclusivity
through successive products, commonly known as ‘product hopping,’ violate the Sherman Act?”75
The defendants manufacture the drug Namenda, a medication used to
treat Alzheimer’s disease76. The defendants have two formulations for the
drug, Namenda IR (IR), an immediate-release drug, and Namenda XR (XR),
an extended-release drug.77 Both versions of Namenda are medically the
same except that the IR version is taken twice a day while the XR version is
only taken once a day, providing different dosing.78 More importantly, they
have different patent expiration dates; IR’s patent was set to expire in July
2015, while XR’s patent will expire in 2029.79 Before this action, Actavis
maintained a monopoly on the memantine-drug market.80
Upon expiration of IR’s patent, several generic equivalents were poised
to enter the market. Accordingly, the defendants removed their original
formulation form the market. Namenda XR could not be substituted for
Generic IR formulas because those drugs were not bioequivalent, which
resulted in this litigation.
for $184M, Law 360, http://www.law360.com/articles/77718/abbott-settles-tricor-class-action-for184m. (last visited Dec. 18, 2016).
73. Royall, supra note 38, at 74 (discussing how the combined holdings of Abbott Labs and AstraZeneca does not address varying scenarios including a manufacturer ceasing to market prior formulations but not entirely removing the formulation from the market).
74. Actavis PLC, 787 F. 3d 638.
75. Id. at 643.
76. Id. at 646.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 647
79. Id.
80. Memantine is an N-Methyl D-Aspartate (“NMDA”) receptor antagonist that affects the glutamate pathway in the brain. Memantine-based drugs, like Namenda, partially block the brain’s NMDA
receptor in order to prevent “over-activation” of that receptor, which can cause toxicity to neurons in the
brain; David Olivares et al., N-Methyl D-Aspartate (NMDA) Receptor Antagonists and Memantine
Treatment for Alzheimer’s Disease, Vascular Dementia and Parkinson’s Disease, 9 Current Alzheimer
Research 746–758, 746-758 (2012) (noting that while there were other FDA approved drugs on the
market to treat Alzheimer’s, such as Aricept, Exelon, and Razadyne, those drugs target different biochemical pathways, therefore, non-substitutable for Namenda).
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In September 2014, New York State filed for a preliminary injunction
against Actavis, alleging violations of antitrust laws.81 The State alleges that
in 2013, Actavis made a “soft switch” to the XR drug in response to IR’s
approaching patent expiration.82 Despite its selling of both IR and XR formulas and vigorous promotion of XR to doctors, patients and pharmacies,
Actavis ceased to promote its IR formulation..83 Moreover, in 2014, the
defendants attempted to make a hard-switch; they announced that they
would discontinue IR and attempted to prevent medical providers from prescribing IR unless it was “medically necessary.”84
The State argued that Actavis attempted to impede the entry of generic
IR by removing Namenda IR from the market, and thus, coerces consumers
into purchasing XR by depriving them of choice.85 As a result, Actavis
would maintain their monopoly over the memantine-drug market.86
The court analyzed whether Actavis attempted to maintain their monopoly under Section 2 of the Sherman Act87. Applying the rule-of-reason test
articulated in Microsoft, 88 the court sought to extricate “conduct that defeats a competitor because of efficiency and consumer satisfaction”89 from
conduct that thwarts the competition by way of “gaming” the system.
The court found that the defendants’ introduction of Namenda XR and
subsequent withdrawal of IR to be coercive and would “likely impede generic completion by precluding generic substitution.”90 By Actavis removing IR from the market, leaving XR as the only available drug of choice,
Actavis is limiting consumer choice to purchase XR91. Because XR has
patent protection, no other bioequivalent drug can compete until its patent
expires in 202992.
Moreover, it is likely that once generic IR is introduced, its marketability
would be severely impaired by XR’s status as the drug of choice, ridding
consumers of incentive to switch back.93 In this scenario, XR’s popularity is
not generated by consumer choice but by an artificial monopolization of the
81. Complaint at 1, New York v. Actavis PLC, 2014 WL 4627802 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2014) (14
CV 7473).
82. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 648.
83. Id. at 647-68.
84. Id. at 648 (attempting to show “medical necessity” would prove futile since both Namenda IR
and XR were only distinguished by their dosing).
85. Id. at 654.
86. Id. at 649.
87. Id. at 651-60.
88. Microsoft, supra note 68.
89. Id. at 652 (quoting U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1359 (2d
Cir. 1988)).
90. Id. at 654.
91. Id. at 654-55.
92. Id. at 642.
93. Id. at 656.
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memantine-drug market. Additionally, the court found Actavis’ procompetitive defense to be “pretextual”94, reasoning that the defendants’ conduct
“makes sense only because it eliminates competition.”95
The court concluded that the “combination of withdrawing a successful
drug from the market and introducing a reformulated version of that drug…
without a legitimate business justification” violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act.96
B. Mylan v. Warner Chilcott
In Mylan v. Warner Chilcott, the plaintiff alleged that Warner Chilcott,
the manufacturer of an unpatented acne medication, violated antitrust laws
by engaging in a “product-hoping scheme” designed to impede generic
competition.97 Mylan brought several claims under the Sherman Act;98 relevant to this discussion is Mylan’s allegation that in anticipation of generic
entry, the defendant executed three product switches99 and then subsequently removed their original formulation off the shelves.100 The plaintiff argued
that “these switches,” provided “little or no therapeutic benefit to consumers,” but “devastated the market for the prior versions of Doryx”. 101
The defendant rebutted that branded drug companies were under no duty
to assist generic drug companies by waiting to phase out older branded
formulations until a generic substitute was available to the public,102 suggesting that this type of “free riding” is “‘the antithesis of competition.’”103
The plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that this case was indistinguishable from New York v. Actavis, and that Warner Chilcott’s act of removing

94. Id. at 658.
95. Id. at 659 (quoting In re Adderall XR Antitrust Litig., 754 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 2014)).
96. Id.
97. Brief for FTC as Amicus Curiae at 18, Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott, Pub. Co., No.
12-3824
(E.D.
Pa.
Nov.
21,
2012)
[hereinafter
FTC
Mylan
Brief],
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/amicus_briefs/mylan-pharmaceuticals-inc.v.warnerchilcott-plc-et-al./151001mylanamicusbrief.pdf.
98. See Appellate Court Opinion at 8, Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott, Pub. Co., No 152236
(3d
Cir.
Sep.
28
2016)
[hereinafter
Mylan
Opinion],
www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/152236p.pdf.
99. Id. Wilcott introduced three new variations of their existing formula, first from a capsule to a
tablet, then from 75mg and 100mg tablets to a single 150mg dosage strength, and finally from a singlescored version of the 150mg tablet to a dual-scored version.
100. Complaint, Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Co., No. 12-3824, 2-5 (E.D. Pa. July 6,
2012) [hereinafter Mylan Complaint].
101. Royall, supra note 38, at 74-75 (citing Mylan Complaint, at 2, 9). Doryx, an oral tetracycline,
is used to treat a wide variety of bacterial infections, including those that cause acne.
102. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Warner Chilcott’s Motion to Dismiss at 16–19,
Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2012).
103. Id. at 24 (quoting Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 376–79
(7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.)).

50

BIOTECHNOLOGY & PHARMACEUTICAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. X:39

its branded medication off the market combined with the introduction of
three substitute formulations violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 104
The Court articulated that the Sherman Act “directs itself not against
conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which
unfairly tends to destroy competition itself.”105 Here, the court distinguished
from Actavis, finding that the defendant had not established a monopoly
over tetracycline-drug market,106 and holding that Mylan was not “foreclosed” from the market. 107 The plaintiff could introduce generic Doryx at
any time after 1985, as Doryx has been on the market for more than 20
years with no patent protection. However, Mylan failed to begin its own
production until 2003.108
Mylan eventually obtained FDA approval for several of its formulations
that would be allowed to compete against other tetracycline drugs. Thus,
any argument that the defendant’s subsequent formulations obstructed the
generic market failed. Ultimately, the court found that Mylan failed to state
an anticompetitive injury.109 Reconciling other claims, the court addressed
the second prong of the Microsoft test. The court found that even if an anticompetitive injury was present, the defendant presented legitimate business
justifications.110 Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff’s did
not meet its burden under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
V. RECONCILING THE SPLIT
A. Product Shifting
Articulated in AstraZeneca and Microsoft, courts will give deference to
innovation.111 Perceivably frivolous changes made to an existing product
formulation are legal per se. In both Actavis and Mylan, brand-name manufacturers made changes to their drug formulations related to either dosing or

104. Mylan Opinion, supra note 102, at 34.
105. Id. at 35 (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993)).
106. Id. 28-32 (discussing how several other tetracycline drugs were on the market and Doryx’s
market share never exceeded 18%). Tetracyline drugs are antibiotic drugs used to treat bacterial infections. Tetracyclines are used to treat various infections including acne, sexually transmitted diseases
such as syphilis, and pneumonia.
107. Id. at 36. (“[Actavis] involved the defendants’ attempts to avoid a “patent cliff” – the end of
patent exclusivity, corresponding to the brand drug’s loss of market share – by stringing together new
periods of patent exclusivity in order to completely bar generics from entering the market. It was alleged
that the defendants did so by introducing changes to their product to delay the expiration of their patent.
Here, there were no patent cliffs on the horizon, and the evidence demonstrates that there were plenty of
other competitors already in the oral tetracycline market.”). Id. at 38.
108. Id. at 16-17.
109. Id. at 37.
110. Id. Warner Chilcott’s formulation changes were in response to doxycycline capsules being
linked with esophageal problems, poor shelf-life, and competitive manufacturers’ introduction of “selfdosing” tablets.
111. See AstraZeneca Pharms.,534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 151; Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65.

Spring 2017]BIOTECHNOLOGY & PHARMACEUTICAL LAW REVIEW

51

switching from capsule to tablet form.112 As expressed in Berkley, courts
do not investigate the significance of these innovations; the purview of their
inquiry deals with whether those innovations create an injury to the competitive market.113
B. Anticompetitive Injury
Injury to the competitor alone is not sufficient to raise an antitrust
claim114. The injury must cause harm to the consumer by way of coercion115. In both cases, generic manufacturers accused brand-name manufacturers of strategically timing the release of their derivative products in order
to interfere with generic competition. In Actavis, the court held that the introduction of patented Namenda XR followed by the removal of Namenda
IR from the market in response to impending generic IR entry rose to the
level of coercion116. Thus, the defendants’ acts were violative of the Sherman Act.117 Conversely, Mylan arrived at a different conclusion, finding
that Cilcott’s introduction of three varied Doryx formulas and removal of
its capsulated Doryx formula did not violate the Sherman Act. 118
In arriving at the holding in these cases, both courts addressed whether
respondent has a pre-existing monopoly or attempted to create a monopoly
over their perspective drugs markets119. Under this analysis, Actavis is distinguished from Mylan. In Actavis, Namenda IR and XR were the only
memantine drugs on the market120. However, in Mylan, there were several
bioequivalent generic drugs on the market prior to Chilcott’s new formulation releases121. Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Actavis had an existing monopoly and their attempts at product hopping would have likely resulted in them extending that monopoly. However, in Mylan, it was unlikely for Chilcott to obtain a monopoly, as their drug competed with many
others in the market and their market share had never exceeded 18%.122
These cases are further distinguished by the protections granted to the
brand-name manufacturers’ subsequent formulations. In Actavis, Namenda
XR was patent protected. In Mylan, Doryx’s new formulations were not
patented.123 Namenda XR provided the defendant with an advantage by
112. Actavis PLC, 787 F. 3d 638, 647-49; Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838
F.3d 421, 428-31 (3d Cir. 2016).
113. Berkey Photo, supra note 67.
114. See Mylan Pharm., 838 F.3d 421, 438.
115. Actavis PLC, 787 F. 3d 638, 654-55; Mylan Pharm., 838 F.3d 421, 441.
116. Actavis PLC, 787 F. 3d 638, 655.
117. Id. at 663.
118. Mylan Pharm., 838 F.3d 421, 441-42.
119. Id., at 433-38; Actavis PLC, 787 F. 3d 638, 651-52.
120. Actavis PLC, 787 F. 3d 638, 652.
121. Mylan Pharm., 838, F. 3d 421, 437-38.
122. Id. at 438.
123. Id. at 440.
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artificially extending Actavis’ absolute monopoly for another 15 years124. In
Mylan, however, neither the original nor derivative formulations were patented. Doryx’s popularity in its market was merit-based while Namenda
became a leading brand through exclusivity.125
C. Legitimate Business Justifications
Microsoft provided that the defendants may rebut a claim that they engaged in anticompetitive practices by providing procompetitive justifications.126 Under this prong, the cases were further distinguished. In Actavis,
the court found that the defendant’s purpose was flagrant;127 the defendants
wanted to fend off generic competition. In Mylan, on the other hand, the
defendant provided substantial justifications. 128
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Second and Third Circuits have appeared to reach unequivocal
decisions in two factually similar cases, both courts have followed the doctrine of stare decisis, rendering decisions consistent with the standards articulated in of Abbott Lab and AstraZeneca129. Where the precedent cases
remained silent,130 the Second and Third Circuits have filled in the gaps.
Accordingly, courts should defer to the rule-of-reason test, initially weighing procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive harms, disregarding whether an intent to establish a monopoly was present. If a product on its merits
results in a monopoly, it reflects the choices of consumers. Thus, further
inquiry would frustrate the purpose of antitrust laws.

124. Actavis PLC, 787 F. 3d 638, 660.
125. See Mylan Pharm., 838, F. 3d 421, 438-39; See Actavis PLC, 787 F. 3d 638, 660-61.
126. Microsoft, supra note 92, at 59.
127. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 658 (“We need to transition volume to XR to protect our
Namenda revenue from generic penetration in 2015 when we lose IR patent exclusivity.”).
128. Mylan, supra note 15, at 37.
129. Abbott Labs., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 421–23; AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146,
150.
130. Royall, supra note 38, at 74.

